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ABSTRACT
Since March 2019, municipalities in Ontario have become increasingly conscious of the role of local
government in addressing the global climate emergency. Although minor departmental initiatives such as
green infrastructure development policies are understood as environmentally conscious, the larger policy
network of municipal governance has only recently entered the climate change mitigation and adaptation
policy field. Declarations of climate emergencies are a modern way for municipal governments to signal
both interest and intended action in climate change policies. In one year, Ontario municipal climate
emergencies increased from 0 to 47, with the 47 municipalities representing nearly 90% of Ontario’s
population. Such interest prompted this analysis of the policymaking structure of local government and
the means by which climate change policy could be introduced and implemented. Policymaking and
capacity theories are used to determine how municipalities can work with upper levels of government
and advocacy groups in order to engage with the policymaking process from a climate change
perspective.
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Introduction
Multilevel governance and the policy process are often discussed with regard to the capacity, role, and
influence of local government. Constitutionally, Canada’s municipal governments may be considered “an
ideological construct” (Good 2019) at large, due to their status as provincially mandated corporations
with predominantly non-partisan elected officials. Traditional thought also assumes a “policy taking”
rather than “policy making” responsibility for municipal policy analysts (Gore 2010) due to the character
of municipalities under provincial and federal jurisdiction in Canada (Côté and Fenn 2014). As the lowest
level of government, municipalities are not awarded the same breadth of capacity or influence in policy
implementation as their federal and provincial counterparts, resulting in a sense of stagnation or substandard permanence regarding policy making as a tool for decision making and problem solving. This is
not to say that Ontario’s municipalities do not have a policymaking role. Indeed, municipal policy making
is a democratic duty of elected councilors (Municipal Act 2001 SO c 25 s 224), while subsequent policy
research and implementation are responsibilities of non-elected municipal staff (s 227). Much like its
overall governance perception, municipal policy must contend with limited capacity and influence relative
to other municipalities, regional governments, and the Province.
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the policy making capacity of municipalities in the
context of the climate crisis. This research builds on existing emergency management (see Henstra 2013;
Labadie 2011; Comfort 2007), intergovernmental relations (see Côté and Fenn 2014; Good 2019) and
climate change mitigation governance (see Smart 2019; Gaddy, Clark and Ryan 2014) studies, adding the
element of Climate Emergency declaration and subsequent action to the discussion of multilevel
governance and policymaking in Ontario. Emergency management policy has been on stark display
throughout 2020 as all levels of government have struggled to address the multifaceted nature of living
through global health, economic, and political crises. As global governance structures continue to adapt
to the reality and permanency of emergency management, municipalities are positioned to expand their
legislative capacity and become more innovative in response to the unpreparedness of climate change
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management. Numerous Canadian municipalities have declared Climate Emergencies as a first response
measure, including 47 Ontario municipalities as of March 2020 (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1: Declared Municipal Climate Emergencies Over Time

While the figure represents less than 11 per cent of the total number of municipalities in Ontario, the
collective population of the municipalities represents nearly 90 per cent of Ontario, as large single tier
and upper tier cities and regions have agreed to prioritized climate crisis management (see Table 1).
Table 1: Alphabetical List of Ontario Municipalities who have officially declared a Climate Emergency
Municipality

Tier

Region

Date of
Declaration

Population

Amherstburg, Town of

Lower Tier

Essex

2019-11-12

23,239

Barrie, City of

Single Tier

Simcoe

2019-10-07

149,302

Brampton, City of

Lower Tier

Peel

2019-06-05

696,975

Brant, County of

Single Tier

Brant

2019-11-26

38,419

Brantford, City of

Single Tier

Brant

2019-11-12

104,902

Burlington, City of

Lower Tier

Halton

2019-04-23

190,194

Caledon, Town of

Lower Tier

Peel

2020-01-28

75,969

Central Elgin, Municipality of

Lower Tier

Elgin

2019-10-28

13,812

Chatham-Kent, Municipality of

Single Tier

Chatham-Kent

2019-07-15

105,666

Clarington, Municipality of

Lower Tier

Durham

2020-03-02

100,562

Cobourg, Town of

Lower Tier

Northumberland

2019-11-25

20,170

Durham, Regional Municipality of

Upper Tier

Durham

2020-01-29

645,862
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Goderich, Town of

Lower Tier

Huron

2020-01-13

8,115

Greater Sudbury, City of

Single Tier

Sudbury

2019-05-28

168,813

Halton Hills, Town of

Lower Tier

Halton

2019-05-06

64,290

Halton, Regional Municipality of

Upper Tier

Halton

2019-09-11

548,435

Hamilton, City of

Single Tier

Hamilton

2019-03-27

574,263

Kenora, City of

Single Tier

Kenora

2019-09-17

15,483

King, Township of

Lower Tier

York

2019-07-08

26,593

Kingston, City of

Single Tier

Frontenac

2019-03-05

135,204

Kitchener, City of

Lower Tier

Waterloo

2019-06-24

26,790

London, City of

Single Tier

Middlesex

2019-04-23

426,139

Meaford, Municipality of

Lower Tier

Grey

2019-11-18

11,694

Milton, Town of

Lower Tier

Halton

2019-07-22

129,334

Mississauga, City of

Lower Tier

Peel

2019-06-19

769,050

Newmarket, Town of

Lower Tier

York

2020-01-13

89,496

Niagara-on-the-Lake, Town of

Lower Tier

Niagara

2020-02-24

18,865

Oakville, Town of

Lower Tier

Halton

2019-06-24

212,551

Ottawa, City of

Single Tier

Ottawa

2019-04-24

1,028,514

Peel, Regional Municipality of

Upper Tier

Peel

2019-10-24

1,484,000

Peterborough, City of

Single Tier

Peterborough

2019-09-23

86,469

Pickering, City of

Lower Tier

Durham

2019-12-16

98,817

Prince Edward, County of

Single Tier

Prince Edward

2019-05-28

25,406

Sarnia, City of

Lower Tier

Lambton

2019-06-17

74,779

St. Catharines, City of

Lower Tier

Niagara

2019-04-29

141,294

St. Thomas, City of

Single Tier

Elgin

2020-02-10

41,795

Stratford, City of

Single Tier

Perth

2020-02-10

33,434

Tecumseh, Town of

Lower Tier

Essex

2019-12-10

24,064

Thunder Bay, City of

Single Tier

Thunder Bay

2020-01-13

112,740

Toronto, City of

Single Tier

Toronto

2019-10-02

2,965,713

Vaughan, City of

Lower Tier

York

2019-06-04

325,678

Waterloo, Regional Municipality of

Upper Tier

Waterloo

2019-10-09

583,500

West Nipissing, Municipality of

Single Tier

Nipissing

2019-04-23

15,014

Whitby, Town of

Lower Tier

Durham

2019-06-24

136,594

Wilmot, Township of

Lower Tier

Waterloo

2019-09-23

21,978

Windsor, City of

Single Tier

Essex

2019-11-18

324,048

Woolwich, Township of

Lower Tier

Waterloo

2019-09-24

26,751
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Climate emergencies have become increasingly popular around the world and at all levels of
government from local to national. Although motivation to declare among Ontario municipalities is
indeterminable as of yet, the sustained growth in local government interest represents a need for a
reconsideration of policymaking roles and norms at the municipal level. While the declaration of a
Climate Emergency does not inherently solve any assumed or anticipated emergencies associated with
climate change, the framing of climate change as an emergency functions as a signal to legislators and
policymakers. The policy process for emergency management policy is a unique policy field for all levels of
government, although especially for municipalities as policymaking is not a clearly defined responsibility
nor a familiar one for many smaller local governments. Although noted in the Municipal Act, 2001,
policymaking is legislated as a role for councilors with no further description other than development and
evaluation; the relevant or allowed subjects, jurisdictions, and general capacities of policymaking are
simply referred to as within the scope of the municipality’s interests (s 8[1]).
Clarity though, is not necessarily a product of a defined subject, as emergency management
policies can be as ambiguous as the term itself. Emergencies, the style of management, and the gravity of
policy are each inconsistently or rigorously defined in the public and professional discourse (Juillet and
Koji 2014). Intergovernmental policymaking may suffice in certain circumstances, where municipalities
are consulted or have extended decision making powers, as in the case of provincial development and
planning policy working to guide municipal development rather than directly oversee.1 No Climate
Emergency Provincial Policy Statement exists at this time, however, and the Province has not directed
municipalities to create a benchmarking system to measure provincial climate policy commitments.
Climate Emergency governance and policymaking, therefore, is both an uncharted and a pertinent
opportunity for municipalities.

1 See

2020 Provincial Policy Statement section 4.9
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The following analysis outlines the role of emergency management and policy from a multilevel
governance perspective. The provincial and federal relationship to municipalities in relation to an
emergency declaration is studied in order to highlight the successes of intergovernmental cooperation
and the drawbacks of unclear and undefined power delegations. This discussion of intergovernmental
cooperation lends to the thesis of intergovernmental dependence and provides a foundation for
understanding the climate emergency as it has manifested at the local level in Ontario. The existing
footprint of emergency policy in Ontario reveals the viability of an expanded role for municipalities should
climate emergencies be considered in a traditional emergency management style. The analysis
culminates in a discussion of policy capacity and governance theory to provide municipalities with the
means to assess capacity from a climate policy perspective. This research demonstrates how and when
municipalities are able to develop and implement policy and the interdependence of governments in
creating policy at the local level.

Multilevel Governance and Policymaking
The Municipal Role: Issue Identification Through Process Norms
The role of a municipality in the policymaking process is acknowledged and understood through the lens
of provincial oversight, despite the complexity of municipal governance and policy not being outlined or
defined in a productive or comprehensive manner. From the multiple levels of government within this
lowest level of government, to the number of channels available for policy promotion and enaction, the
policy process for municipalities in Ontario remains significantly more nuanced than that of its provincial
and federal counterpart. Municipalities are tasked with observing a network of issues available for policy
consideration and measuring the risk of policy action, as with any other level of government, yet without
the formal designation or authority of a provincial or federal government.
Although generally irrelevant in the context of this analysis as diffusion and correlation between
municipal government tiers is outside the scope of this research, understanding the role of Ontario’s
multi-tier system of municipal governance is necessary for understanding why municipalities rely on
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normative procedures for policy action. Ontario’s municipal legislation footprint is large, looming, and is a
primary reason for the growth of conventional, consorted, normative governance activity among
municipalities. However, the non-normative (i.e. formal laws and regulations) legislated impact Ontario
has over its municipalities includes defining the scope of authority delegated to single-, upper-, and
lower-tier municipalities. Section 10(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001 affords single-tier municipalities the
power to pass by-laws in the following areas:
1. Governance structure of the municipality and its local boards.
2. Accountability and transparency of the municipality and its operations and of its local boards
and their operations.
3. Financial management of the municipality and its local boards.
4. Public assets of the municipality acquired for the purpose of exercising its authority under this
or any other Act.
5. Economic, social and environmental well-being of the municipality, including respecting
climate change.
6. Health, safety and well-being of persons.
7. Services and things that the municipality is authorized to provide under subsection (1).
8. Protection of persons and property, including consumer protection.
9. Animals.
10. Structures, including fences and signs.
11. Business licensing. 2006, c. 32, Sched. A, s. 8; 2017, c. 10, Sched. 1, s. 1.

Similarly, section 11(2) and 11(3) of the Municipal Act provides lower-tier and upper-tier municipalities
the same by-law creating powers in the same areas, in addition to the following areas outlined in section
11(3):
1. Highways, including parking and traffic on highways.
2. Transportation systems, other than highways.
3. Waste management.
4. Public utilities.
5. Culture, parks, recreation and heritage.
6. Drainage and flood control, except storm sewers.
7. Structures, including fences and signs.
8. Parking, except on highways.2

While the areas are similar for all three tiers of municipal government, the scope, or “sphere of
jurisdiction”, in which a by-law may be created, applied, or nullified varies. Subsections four through eight

2 Further

stipulations are addressed in the legislation, however for the purpose of this research, the above
delegations are sufficient.
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and subsection 11 of section 11 of the Municipal Act are written to address the varying exceptions and
applications of by-laws created by lower- and upper-tier municipalities. As well, subsections three
through five of section 10 address the same variation for single-tier municipalities. That is to say,
conclusively, the ambiguity surrounding multilevel municipal by-law creation is written into the legislation
governing such creation.
The municipal role in policymaking and governance is further complicated by the language used
to delegate authority. The Municipal Act, as noted above, confers powers to municipalities to pass bylaws. By-laws differ from policies, and both differ from resolutions, all of which are used interchangeably
and under the scope of authority delegated to municipalities under various sections of the Municipal Act.
Essentially, by-laws are pieces of municipal legislation that govern actions within the municipality and can
result in legal consequences for non-compliance; policies may provide guidance or governance to staff,
councillors, or citizens and are typically included in municipal official plans; and, resolutions are records of
council deliberation and, while less formal, “often express the municipality’s position on issues or
concerns about existing government policy” (Public Health Ontario 2014; Ministry of Municipal Affairs
and Housing 2019). From a governance perspective, by-laws are therefore the most legally binding,
followed by policies, and then resolutions, however all reflect the democratic process of issue
consideration and decision making.
As policymaking is the subject of this analysis, the linguistic significance of the term “policy” is
aptly considered. Municipalities are not bound to a governing style as made evident by the suggestive
enforcement of by-law creation in the Municipal Act, in addition to the various options for council
decision making. With regard to municipal policies, the Municipal Act does acknowledge that
municipalities have polices, but does not address the creation and implementation process in the same
extensive manner in which by-law creation is addressed. As well, the Municipal Act equates resolutions to
by-laws, as the phrase “or resolution” follows the word “by-law” nearly every time it is mentioned in the
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legislation (see sections 23.1 [3], 23.4 [1], 44 [14], and 190 [1 c, d]). This congruence is in conflict with the
definitions provided by the Province quoted above, as resolutions reflect issue positions and by-laws
reflect a method of legal recourse for a municipality. While section 8 of the legislation allows for broad
interpretation of the Municipal Act by municipalities, the strong enforcement in some areas of
governance and not in others creates a discrepancy in understanding how and when municipalities may
develop and implement policies. Despite this uncertainty, normative governance has provided a
foundation for municipalities from which to work, as upper-, single-, and lower-tier governments have
assumed similar roles across the province and delegated authority within the municipal structure in order
to accommodate any ambiguity (Taylor 2016, 12). And while normative behaviour has been sufficient,
norms surrounding municipal climate governance do not yet altogether exist.
Taylor (2016) writes that process-oriented governance is predicated on norms, as the
policymaking process demands the competence and capacity provided by normativity. However, the
novelty of municipal climate policymaking has not yet created its own norms. Ontario municipalities
began declaring Climate Emergencies in March of 2019, and no measurable or comparable policy
outcomes or initiatives resulting from the declarations are available yet. The role of municipal governance
in policymaking is ambiguous and could be said to rely on supportive norms. Normativity is not inherently
an unsuitable precedent, rather it merely does not have a place in the climate governance conversation
at this time. The process of creating, testing, and adhering to norms is time intensive and climate policy
must be more reactive if not proactive. This research posits that municipalities are poised to undertake a
stronger policymaking role in the understudied area of climate emergency preparedness and mitigation.
And if the existing role of municipal governance is either austerely ambiguous or reliant on process
norms, a new means for policymaking is a necessity for novel climate change policy solutions.

The Federal Role: Climate Governance
Ambiguity, though, does not exist solely at the municipal level within and between tiers. The consensus
surrounding federal-municipal relations has been continuously redefined throughout Canada’s history,
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and redefined by the federal government. Recent redefinition in 2004 saw the New Deal for Cities and
Communities from the Martin Liberal Government in an effort to assist in climate mitigation and
adaptation measures. The financial and social commitment to assist municipal governments with
infrastructure development and community building is one of the earlier consolidated efforts to include
municipalities in the discussion and action of climate change mitigation, as the New Deal was developed
with context from Canada’s recent Kyoto Protocol commitments in the early 2000s (Shaker 2004). The
New Deal, while not an emergency policy, does stress some urgency in the climate change conversation
between government actors and policy makers. The following discussion reviews the role of the federal
government in creating, adapting, and/or promoting municipal climate governance interests since 2004
with a focus on how Liberal and Conservative governments have addressed municipalities and what
municipalities have been able to accomplish over 16 years of federal policy fluctuation.
The role of the federal government relative to municipal policymaking is not to provide a
framework within which municipalities may interpret and develop a normative understanding of
legislation best practices. Rather, the federal government acts in a more acute and objective manner,
imposing initiatives and policies for municipalities to accept. Federal-municipal governance can operate in
such a controlled manner due to the broadly comprehensive nature of federal policy, which must account
for national needs over local demands (Horak 2012, 349). However, the nature of climate change as a
global emergency, dependent on the acknowledgement and action from everyone, demands national
leadership for climate action diplomacy. Federal initiatives addressing climate change are created for
international compliance yet must be enacted through local means. This indirect relationship can limit the
effectiveness of federal agreements.
Cities account for over 70% of global emissions (Federation of Canadian Municipalities 2020a).
This does not mean that municipal government operations are detrimental to climate change mitigation
efforts, but rather that the overall operations of individuals and, more significantly, corporations within
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cities contribute to carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions at a far greater scale than the operations in rural
areas. Without a strong policy and action relationship between municipalities and the federal
government, commitments to reduce national emissions by 30% below 2005 emission levels by 2030
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2020) will not be possible. The key issue regarding the federal
question in the context of this research is, how does federal climate governance policy include and
support municipalities? And, if it does not include or support municipalities, how can they engage with
the policy in a meaningful way?
While not directly supportive of or associated with municipalities in most instances, the recent
efforts of the Liberal federal government, such as the Canada Infrastructure Bank and Paris Agreement
commitments, have demonstrated a willingness to address climate change as an issue and a crisis, and
has opened a policy window for climate action policy development. Federal partisanship is not a
significant topic of a discussion in this analysis, and is only relevant in the context of highlighting the
relationship between the policy process and the level of government at which it takes place. Climate
change, despite increasing efforts from the scientific community to provide and communicate the
imminent crisis caused by the Anthropocene, is a partisan political issue. The urgency at which climate
change must be mitigated and planned for is a matter that can be traced on the political spectrum, with
Canada’s current Liberal leadership placing more urgency with the matter than the former Conservative
federal leadership. This tracing is most easily understood through the procedural process of Bill C-311, a
federal climate action that intended to set targets for emission reductions at a national level through
mitigation regulations. Bill C-311, the Climate Change Accountability Act, was ultimately not accepted by
the Senate, without debate, after nearly two and a half years of consideration by the House Standing
Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development. From its introduction in June 2008
through its dissolution in November 2010, the federal Conservative government was not supportive of
the New Democratic Party-backed private member’s bill and effectively determined the negative
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outcome of Bill C-311, which was the only climate change mitigation-related legislation at the time
(Climate Action Network Canada 2011; Galloway 2010).
While emergency policy and climate action for municipalities is not dictated or addressed by the
federal government, federal leadership on climate change is becoming increasingly relevant and
demanded. As cities move forward in declaring climate emergencies, the relationship between municipal
policymaking and federal climate action commitments should be reassessed. Climate change mitigation
and adaptation does not occur in a vacuum and requires extensive multilevel government cooperation.
The tools for policy coordination between the federal and municipal governments are further discussed in
later capacity analyses, however the above discussion on federal initiatives provides necessary context as
to how the policy ideas have been and may be interpreted.

The Provincial Role: Financing Policy
As the intermediate level between municipal and federal government, the provincial role in the policy
process is directive, both in terms of the legal and financial authority provinces maintain over
municipalities (Henstra 2018). The federal government’s disengagement with municipalities requires
provinces and territories to manage their legislative discretion in order to provide for both the existence
and success of municipal operations and governance. Despite the growth of Ontario’s cities as
international urban centers and the moves toward greater municipal self-governing powers in the
Municipal Act, 2001 and charter city suggestions, Ontario remains “firmly in control” of municipal
governments, especially in terms of policymaking and policy financing (Côté and Fenn 2014, 3; Siegel and
Tindal 2006). While the policymaking powers of municipalities have been previously considered, the
following discussion focuses less on the limitations of the policy process for municipalities and more on
the financial responsibility of Ontario as a policymaking body.
Much of the existing literature on provincial policymaking for municipalities in Ontario is critical
of the power imbalance between the government levels. Côté and Fenn (2014) discuss the contention of
provincial-municipal relationships, suggesting that municipalities are becoming more relevant as
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government actors as larger cities become urban economic development centers, and that the
antiquated understanding of provincial oversight in municipal policy must be adjusted. Provincialmunicipal relations present a theoretical arena for management theory debate, whether the traditional
New Public Management ideas of efficiency and privatization or more recent ideas from New Public
Service’s more personalized resident-focused approach are better suited to address the needs of a
multilevel democratic venue (Mintzberg and Bourgault 2000). While this research does not present
quantitative evidence supporting a relationship management strategy that combines the interests of both
Ontario and its municipalities, the following explanation of the provincial policy process does provide a
lens to examine the provincial role in municipal climate emergency management.
Examining the provincial policy role provides the clearest understanding of how municipalities
may use climate emergencies to become policy entrepreneurs. Since Ontario is the primary legislative
body overseeing municipal operations, authority to develop and implement policies at the municipal level
must be contained within the context of provincial legislation. Impediments to municipal policymaking
authority are contained in, but not restrained to, the language of provincial legislation that limits the
scope and role of municipal governance. Particularly surrounding the policy area of climate change
mitigation and adaptation, “issues of finance and autonomy” (Gore 2010, 31) are at the forefront.
Policymaking requires policy financing as part of the change implementation process. In 2017, the City of
Toronto estimated that climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts over the coming years would
cost between $320 million and $886 million (Carvalho 2018, 11). Detailed budgets for projects, programs,
and policies planned by Toronto over the period are not within the scope of this research, however the
overall cost helps to highlight the demand for municipal action and the need for provincial assistance.
Henstra (2018) describes the provincial-municipal policymaking relationship as “relatively stable and
predictable” (125) due to strong provincial oversight and regulation. While municipal policymaking does
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occur through various methods and on multiple subjects, the process and subsequent policy is
nevertheless normative, risk-averse, and subject to intense and direct scrutiny.
Such policy characteristics are reflective of the conservative financial state of municipalities (Côté
and Fenn 2014). Municipalities are obligated to manage budgets and spending in accordance with
provincial legislation and standards, ultimately limiting the fiscal capacity of policymaking. A notable
example of provincial shortcomings in municipal policy financing is in infrastructure and asset
management and maintenance. Municipalities are often criticized for the challenges that come with
maintaining the significant capital asset that is physical infrastructure (such as bridges, road, and
municipally-owned land) (Bird and Slack 2018), leading to greater involvement and assistance from
Ontario’s government. However, the introduction of asset management legislation such as Ontario
Regulation 588/17 did not provide the financial assistance assumingly desired, and rather requires
municipalities to update existing asset management strategies in order to more efficiently plan for
lifecycle costing of infrastructure assets (Asset Management Planning for Municipal Infrastructure, O Reg
588/17). Asset management policy from the provincial government was created due to the fiscal burden
municipal infrastructure disrepair could cause the province, while municipalities continue to struggle with
infrastructure maintenance financing (Côté and Fenn 2014, 43). Based on this precedent, it is not difficult
to imagine Ontario providing insufficient policy solutions for climate emergencies, especially considering
the close association between infrastructure and climate mitigation and adaptation (Carvalho 2018). One
facility where provincial policy and financial assistance converge is in the Ontario Financing Authority’s
Green Bond development lending program, however bureaucratic barriers limit the effectiveness of
Green Bonds in Ontario and have consequently not be widely adopted by municipalities (Carvalho 2018,
24).
The provincial role in municipal policymaking is greater than that of the federal government, both
in the authority of Ontario’s oversight and autonomy limitation. Municipalities rely on provinces for
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direction on all matters of governance, including those with limited policy precedent. Climate emergency
declarations are increasingly popular throughout Ontario, from the largest cities and regions (Toronto,
Peel) to very small towns (Clarington, Meaford). While governance autonomy would aid municipalities in
developing policy more freely, climate change action is not centred on provincial-municipal power
struggles. The multilevel approach to policymaking that currently exists requires far more collaboration
from the multiple levels. The ambiguity of Ontario’s municipal policymaking network may be diminished
if, as governments move forward addressing climate change-related emergencies, municipal
governments are provided greater legislative and financial liberty to pursue policy solutions.

Acts, Bills, and a Memorandum
Emergency Legislation in Ontario
Due to apparent barriers attributed to intergovernmental and multilevel bureaucratic ambiguity, climate
emergencies and climate change may appear out of scope. However, emergency policy as it exists at the
federal and provincial levels provides a plausible framework for climate change mitigation, adaptation,
and prevention. Emergency preparedness and planning legislation such as the federal Emergencies Act,
1985 and Emergency Management Act, 2007 each address a potential state of emergency governance.
While these Acts do not directly address municipal governance, the network within which emergency
policy is contrived must be considered moving forward in addressing the global climate emergency.
Additionally, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),
the Ontario provincial Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, 1990, and the recent Ontario
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Support and Protection Act, 2020, are either directly related to or greatly involved
with municipal governance and autonomous policymaking.
Emergency legislation exists at all three levels of government in Canada and is codified for the
national and provincial governments. Declarations of emergencies and invocations of emergency
legislation trigger something of a domino effect of aid availability and temporary special powers to
different levels and ministries of government in order to manage issues outside of the normal scope of
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government. The Emergencies Act, 1985 exists to allow the federal government to take “special
temporary measures” in order to ensure national public welfare remains intact (Emergencies Act, RSC
1985, c 22 [4th Supp]). Similarly, the Emergency Management Act, 2007 further outlines ministerial
responsibilities and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency in order to mitigate, prepare for,
respond to, and/or recover from national emergencies (Emergency Management Act, SC 2007, c 15, s 2).
The 1985 and 2007 emergency related Acts are similar in intent and purpose, differing primarily in how
power is delegated and the scope in which powers can be used. For example, the Emergencies Act
requires federal consultation with lieutenant governors prior to federal powers being implemented within
a province (s 14, s 25) and cannot invoke or involve police authority within provinces, even if the province
relies on RCMP police powers (s 20). The Emergency Management Act, alternatively, is more of a job
description for the federal Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, outlining the various
duties of the role in section 4 of the Act. Both pieces of federal legislation address the international
community and the potential need for a coordinated international response to an emergency, but do not
address coordination with municipal governments, assumingly due to the provincial capacity to oversee
municipal matters in the event of an emergency. Neither the 1985 or 2007 Acts specify a type of
emergency that would constitute an emergency invocation, as that would be limiting; however, the
language of military use in both, and the Emergencies Act section III and IV which outline emergency
capacity in the event of international violence or force, or war with Canada and/or its allies (respectively),
strongly suggest that federal emergencies commonly involve national or international conflict.
Invocation of a national emergency under these Acts comes when the provinces are assumed to
be incapable of handling an emergency alone and require a unifying force (Swiffen 2020). A push for
emergency management unity, however, should not be necessarily predicated by war. Provincial unity on
climate emergency policy is difficult for reasons of political partisanship outlined in the previous section
on federal governance. A province could be deemed incapable of handling the climate crisis by failing to
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acknowledge it, made possible as some Conservative premiers have opted out of carbon-pricing or
emission reductions (Wells 2018). A unified, democratic response to climate change is required in order
to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover. In conversation with climate activist Naomi Klein, sociologist
Barry Smart (2020) writes, “Fixing things will require … the practice of a form of government that is able
to implement policy initiatives that prioritise the commons” (28-29). As the Canadian commons begins to
grapple with the effects of a warming climate and increases in extreme weather events, such as the
deadly 2018 Quebec heat wave or the more frequent wildfires devastating western provinces, the unity
of a national emergency may be required in order to enact comprehensive policy.
A national climate emergency would not only mean federal policy, however, as the invocation
would result in further measures to be taken by provincial and municipal governments. The provincial
emergency legislation in Ontario is formally limited to one Act, however the municipal legislative footprint
also alludes to emergency powers and autonomy for municipalities. The Emergency Management and
Civil Protection Act, 1990 greatly emphasizes the responsibility of municipalities during emergencies,
dedicating section 2.1, section 3, and section 4 of the legislation to the guidelines for municipal
emergency management plans. And while both the province and municipalities are authorized to declare
emergencies subject to section 7.0.1 and section 4(1), respectively, the authority of the province remains
stronger and the Premier or Lieutenant Governor may terminate an emergency declaration at any time in
any place in the province (s 4[4]). The strong powers Ontario’s premier maintains over municipal
governance are made evident throughout this legislation, especially in section 7 which includes a
dedicated subsection on “Powers of Premier, municipal powers” (s 7.0.3[2]). The premier has ultimate
control over any emergency in the province and can delegate chief authority to any minister (s 7.0.4[1])
and direct municipal councils to assist other municipalities within the province (s 7.0.3[2b]). While such
powers granted to the premier may seem authoritarian, section 13.1 (4) provides a necessary and useful
limit to provincial emergency governance, stating “the Lieutenant Governor in Council may by order
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authorize the payment of the costs incurred by a municipality in respect of an order made under
this Act out of funds appropriated by the Assembly.” Former Ontario Deputy Minister Michael Fenn
(Matheson, Fenn & Steele 2020) has stated that the municipal relationship with the province of Ontario is
fundamentally financial; and this relationship is reliant on its fiscal roots inside and outside of
emergencies.

Emergency Policy and Multilevel Governance
Ontario’s most recent and perhaps most dramatic emergency declaration is ongoing in the midst of the
2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Bills 187 and 189 from the Legislative Assembly of Ontario were quickly passed
in the early stages of Ontario’s pandemic response in an effort to support municipalities and their
residents. Bill 187, the Municipal Emergency Act amends the Municipal Act and the City of Toronto Act to
allow municipal councils and boards to update procedure bylaws which would allow for electronic
governance to promote physical distancing. Bill 189, the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Support and Protection
Act amends meeting schedule timelines legislated under various acts pertaining to municipal
administration, such as the Development Charges Act (Raponi 2020). These emergency response bills
provide clarity for municipalities regarding administrative capacity during an extended pandemic
emergency. In addition to these Bills, the formal emergency declaration on March 17 th 2020 heavily
impacted and continues to impact municipalities and their public health units. The state of emergency
was invoked under the strong legislative authority of section 7.0.1 of the Emergency Management and
Civil Protection Act, therefore establishing overarching emergency powers for Premier Doug Ford.
The appropriateness or timing of emergency declarations is not debated in this analysis, as
pandemic emergency governance is a complex political field. The suitability of emergency legislation to
create and enact climate change adaptation and mitigation policy at the municipal level is what this
analysis is addressing. Climate change and COVID-19 are not the same. While the negative and deadly
health impacts of extreme weather and rising global temperatures could be construed to define climate
change and a health pandemic, an emergency response to what some governments perceive as a non-
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imminent non-threat (Smart 2020) has not yet been realized. The emergency response to the 2020
pandemic, however, does illustrate the willingness to enact broad policy in the absence of a
comprehensive plan due to the changing nature of the emergency. The emergency response also
illustrates the means through which the province can invoke ultimate power while addressing the
intricacies of municipal administration.
As part of this administration, Ontario’s 1990 emergency legislation under section 2.1 requires all
municipalities to create an “emergency management program” including a plan, public communication
strategies, and staff and council training exercises. Although, by nature, emergencies are difficult to plan
for, the provincial mandate represents a policy opportunity for municipalities to document a response
mechanism for climate emergencies. The City of Toronto’s 2017 Emergency Management Plan is a
comprehensive example of provincially mandated municipal emergency management. The plan defines
the roles of municipal staff and council, local boards and commissions in the event of an emergency;
types of emergencies that may be encountered and the degree of response required; and risk assessment
and response measures. As the types of emergencies outlined include floods, extreme heat or cold
weather, storms, and fires (2017, 19), the Plan has prepared the City to respond to climate changerelated emergencies. However, the Plan has not been updated since Toronto declared a climate
emergency in 2019 and does not account for climate change as a threat category (19). This is all to say
that the framework for climate emergency governance and policy exists in the emergency management
program footprint set out by the province to which municipalities should adhere.
Correspondingly, the municipal autonomy framework need also be discussed in this analysis.
Despite the understanding that multilevel government cooperation is required for effective climate
change mitigation and adaptation policy and that policy solutions do not happen in a single-level vacuum,
municipal autonomy and authority relative to provinces remains limited. The AMO MOU is a decisive
work of municipal advocacy, promoting intergovernmental cooperation between Ontario and its
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municipalities. The MOU is a joint agreement between Ontario and the Minister of Municipal Affairs and
Housing and the AMO on behalf of all Ontario municipalities that emphasizes the need for provincialmunicipal consultation, communication, and coordination on matters related to municipalities and the
provincial level. The MOU does not grant municipalities decision making authority, but rather equates the
provincial and municipal voices where municipal policymaking is concerned. The MOU, however, is
merely a pillar of the climate emergency policy foundation, as emergency cooperation and coordination
are not mentioned. Though the MOU may be considered a “peacetime” formality, not suitable for times
of emergency management (Matheson, Fenn & Steele 2020), the organization nevertheless ensures a
basis of mutual respect between levels of government, acting as a stimulus for further cooperative
policymaking.
Essentially, the broad authority permitted by section 8 of the Municipal Act, along with the
consultation agreement from the MOU place municipalities in a position of means without wealth –
Ontario’s municipalities are recognized as having complex governance standards and administrative
needs in the event of an emergency, yet must be told how and when to act by upper levels of
government. The policymaking network of emergency management is stepwise, deductive, and highly
regulated. Municipalities can operate within this network, however constrained they may be. Except
emergency management programming is rarely at the forefront of a municipal governance agenda as
emergencies rarely reach a level that requires complete intragovernmental management (Henstra 2013).
Declarations of climate emergencies follow a similar pattern – municipalities do not have the potential
actual emergencies associated with climate change at the forefront of their governance agendas due to
the varied and non-immediate nature of climate change disasters (Fitzgerald 2020, 168). This framing of
climate change as a policy issue has created a ceremonial and impractical understanding of climate
emergency management. The climate emergency is an emergency that, based on its identifier, is
foreseen and can be sufficiently planned for with extensive policy and programming. Yet the identified
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“emergency” is not enough of an emergency, despite it being a catalyst for types of real emergencies
such as those outlined in Toronto’s Emergency Management Plan. There remains a divide between
climate emergencies and generally accepted emergencies, in addition to the divide between municipal
emergency management and provincial emergency invocation.

Municipal Climate Emergency Declarations
What is a Climate Emergency?
Contextualizing policymaking from a legislative perspective outlines the operational reality of
municipalities succeeding in climate governance and policymaking. Municipalities have been established
as members of the public service, willing and able to act on matters of decided importance. Both in terms
of emergency legislation and climate change mitigation and adaptation policy, municipalities are subject
to the will of upper levels of government, primarily provincial. However, discretionary powers of
emergency declaration are granted to municipal leaders per section 4(1) of the Emergency Management
and Civil Protection Act, 1990. Forty-seven Ontario municipalities have declared climate emergencies
since March 2019; and, while the act may be seen as a symbolic gesture and lacking substantive action,
declaring a climate emergency remains a method for municipal councils to signal to their communities
and to other public entities that addressing the impacts of the climate crisis is a necessary consideration
regarding all matters of governance moving forward. Former Chief Resilience Officer for the City of
Toronto, Elliott Cappell, understands climate emergency declarations to be “a starting point to getting all
the different arms of government to move in the same direction … [to] create a shared lingua franca on
which to work and engage the public on the real scale of the challenge” (Cappell 2019). As all
departments of municipal governments begin to address climate change, municipal operations will
change in order to reflect new initiatives, procedures, and policies. Many climate emergency declarations
made by Ontario municipalities include actions to further invest in and plan for climate change. These
declarations are not full strategic plans, but rather visions that will lead to missions that will result in
actions.
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Climate emergency declarations have become an increasingly popular way for governments to
signal their comprehension and capacity of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The 2019 Oxford
Languages Word of the Year was “climate emergency”, due to the demonstrated “heightened public
awareness of climate science and the myriad implications for communities around the world” (Oxford
University Press 2019). Cohen (2020) similarly notes that the rise in governments addressing climate
change with policy initiatives like Green New Deals also surged in 2019. With governments of all levels
and sizes around the world beginning to understand the need for diplomacy and governance in reducing
emissions and gravely altering material consumption patterns, the climate emergency has grown into a
movement. However, should policy alternatives and climate governance fail to move forward at the pace
of global average temperature rise, the movement becomes largely symbolic. The symbolic gesture of
declaring a climate emergency is where many governments face criticism.

Motivations for Declaring Climate Emergencies.
Of the 47 municipalities that have declared climate emergencies, motivation is difficult to establish.
Nearly half (20 out of 47) municipalities referenced the United Nations International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) reports on the necessity of climate change mitigation strategies. While reference points
such as international data do provide some understanding of how the declarations are decided on, the 20
municipalities are not unified in any other measure; tier, population, and timing do not have an impact on
whether or not the IPCC is referenced (see Appendix 1). Additionally, council meeting minutes do not
indicate a consistent recommendation catalyst, with some municipalities relying on advisory committees,
some on outside environmental organizations, some on councillors, and one municipality who voted to
declare a climate emergency based on a deputation from a former chief planner (Municipality of
Clarington 2020). The City of Kingston, Ontario’s first municipality to declare a climate emergency on 5
March 2019, was motivated by deputations from a professor and students from Queen’s University’s
environmental studies program and the co-founders of the Kingston Climate Hub (City of Kingston 2019).
The motivation is difficult to determine, however, based on the variety, declaration motivation may be
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attributed to the increase in collective understanding throughout the world as residents, councillors, and
non-government actors attempt to influence the governments they exist under.
Even in determining motivation for climate emergency declarations, municipalities such as the
City of Guelph have actively refused to use the language of the climate emergency due to the oftenperceived virtue signaling of the declaration. In May 2019, the City of Guelph Council met to discuss the
City’s 2050 renewable energy targets. The first amendment to this discussion sought to have Guelph
“[acknowledge] the impacts of climate change and [join] citizens, cities and countries around the world in
declaring a climate emergency” (City of Guelph 2019, 12). This first amendment was further amended
with a narrowly carried rewording of “the City of Guelph acknowledges the impacts of climate change and
joins citizens, cities and countries around the world in acknowledging a climate emergency” and further
amended to read, “the City of Guelph acknowledges the impacts of climate change and joins citizens,
cities and countries around the world in acknowledging a climate crisis” (13). Choosing to acknowledge a
climate crisis rather than declare a climate emergency positions Guelph outside of the standard narrative
but within the linguistic confines of climate change acceptance. Similarly, Prince Edward County motioned
to amend the wording of their declaration to “climate urgency” rather than an emergency, however
deputations from the public insisting on a more standardized wording resulted in the resolution, “To
support other communities that have elected to 'name and frame' this global crisis by officially declaring a
climate emergency” (Prince Edward County 2019, 12). The Region of Waterloo, as well, cited Guelph’s
language decision, however ultimately concluded that “utilizing the term emergency over crisis makes it
part of the global movement and brings it as one voice and stands united with fellow municipalities”
(Region of Waterloo 2019, 3). Waterloo also worked with a climate communications consultant (21)
furthering the linguistic authority of the term “climate emergency” as both a tool of climate advocacy and
public communication.
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Lindsay (2010) argues that in liberal states, such as Canada, the climate emergency can be
understood through the lens of general emergency governance. They note that the scope and allocation
of power is altered in emergency situations, but also that “emergency government … is a strategic
condition of the state” (2010, 266). The strategic condition of climate emergency governance has not yet
been established; that is to say, the strategy for the circumstance of a climate emergency is not complete
at any level of government. The Ontario municipal strategy for climate emergencies currently is to
normalize climate emergency declarations, expand the movement as Waterloo’s reasoning suggests, and
follow with climate emergency actions. The climate emergency, when treated as an emergency and not a
declaration, allows for policy planning and implementation (Lindsay 2010, 280). Lindsay further writes
that “the evidentiary burden for abstention from emergency action” falls on those who do not accept the
condition of the climate emergency and possibly on those who do not see policymaking value in
emergency governance powers (274).
To declare a climate emergency as a municipality in Ontario is to both accept the reality of the
climate crisis and join a global movement that aims to collectively act on mitigation and adaptation
strategies. Municipal emergency powers are limited by the provincial government, however the
conditions of emergency powers under a climate emergency declaration are unknown and therefore not
subject to the same limitations. As municipalities move forward with gestures of international
compliance, policy capacity will grow. Addressing climate change as an emergency results in urgency
framing and requires an evaluation of the issue from an innovative perspective.

Policy Capacity Analysis and Measures
The legislative capacity for policymaking, however significant it may be, is one measure of many where
emergency preparedness and management aptitude and power are concerned. For example, municipal
policymaking capacity for economic development programs in Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe
region differ from the capacity to enact policy changes that would limit food waste from local grocery
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stores or reduce the number of cars permitted to drive on municipal roadways. Formally, “capacity refers
to the amount of professional and budgetary resources that are available to an entity to carry out a
process, and the degree of sophistication with which the process is carried out” (Loh 2015, 134). Policy
capacity requires even more than corporate resources, however, as the policy process also demands a
constant operational commitment from council, staff and those impacted by the policy itself. The policy
process is unlike that of a municipal procedure or project, to which Loh applies the definition of
operational capacity quoted above. Rather, the process is ongoing with no clear conception or conclusion
measures, as policies and policy solutions are conceived from problems, evaluations, solutions, and
projections (Henstra 2010). This section proposes potential policy capacity measures based on how the
climate emergency has been approached thus far, how municipalities have successfully maintained good
governance, and how emergency policy has been enacted (see Table 2).
Table 2: Climate Emergency Policy Capacity Matrix
Climate Emergency Policy Capacity
Capacity Measures
Theories of Capacity

Community
Policy Venue
Provincial/Federal Provincial/Federal
Advocacy
and Agenda
Cooperation
Financing
Coalitions
Coordination

Taylor (2016) Good Governance
Theory

x

x

Comfort (2007) Crisis
Management Theory

x

x

Henstra and Thistlethwaite
(2017) Risk Management
Theory

x

x

x

x

x

Labadie (2011) Adaptive
Capacity Theory

x
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As proposed in Table 2, policy capacity measures align with four varied theories of municipal governance
capacity, discussed in detail below. Though not comprehensive of climate emergency policy responses
nor governance capacity theories, the Matrix provides a lens through which the policy examples in the
proceeding section may be viewed. These measures differ from the theories to which they are compared,
as they are not as theoretically exclusive. The four theories of capacity each offer their own measures of
policy capacity to determine municipal capacity in areas of efficient flood risk management (such as with
Henstra and Thistlethwaite [2017]) or emergency communication (such as with Comfort [2007]). The
capacity measures listed above offer a broader scope of emergency capacity that relies on the individual
specific measures presented by other emergency and governance theorists. Essentially, this matrix
provides a foundation for the novel climate change policy network being developed through new climate
emergency discussions and declarations.

Capacity Measures (x-axis)
Four probable measures of capacity are measured alongside four governance capacity theories varying in
scope and theme. The measures of capacity are based on available data on effective climate change
mitigation and adaptation action and include: a collective, community-driven effort to reduce the
negative impacts of climate change, known as an Advocacy Coalition (Heinmiller and Pirak 2016); both
multi-level government cooperation and financing; and a network of policy framing initiatives that place
climate policy as a solution in multiple venues and agendas. As noted throughout this analysis, climate
change mitigation and adaptation efforts are ineffective unless performed at a large scale, with broad
commitment from leaders and followers (Gaddy, Clark and Ryan 2014). When reduced, Loh’s definition of
municipal operational capacity essentially refers to the willingness of government actors and leaders to
dedicate resources to matters of significance. Based on the formality (and in some cases, contention) of
climate emergency declarations, 47 of Ontario’s municipalities, including the those with the largest
populations such as Toronto, the Region of Peel, and Waterloo Region, are willing to dedicate knowledge,
time, and financial resources to the climate change mitigation and adaptation policy process.
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Where this analysis continues is with the four additional measures of capacity to supplement the
baseline of operational will. The first measure, community support and advocacy, is derived from the
notion that climate change solutions must be a collective effort. The Advocacy Coalition Framework as
studied by Heinmiller and Pirak (2016), while in the context of land use policy, offers insight into how
community support can effectively manifest government action and change. The authors write that
advocacy coalitions are useful in policy situations involving “wicked problems”, which climate change
mitigation and adaptation may be characterized as. The air of disagreement and/or distrust surrounding
wicked problems allows community support to provide the political backing for policy decision (2016,
172). The study concludes that community support, when coordinated and collaborative in advocacy
coalitions, represents a powerful voice in the policy process. Advocacy coalitions are defined as groups of
“likeminded policy actors” capable of engaging in “substantive collective action” (169). Additionally,
Henstra (2018) suggests “the range of feasible policy solutions available to municipal governments is
influenced by pressure groups, such as neighbourhood associations, community service clubs and
merchant’s associations” (127), further broadening the requirements for meaningful community impact
on local policymaking. A recently formed community of policy actors, the signatories of the 2020
Declaration for Resilience in Canadian Cities, presents a clear example of a climate change action
advocacy coalition as group of former and current government professionals who are committed to
influencing planning and development policy in cities from an environmentally conscious perspective.
Community advocacy and leadership is a democratic means of policy influence, reliant on elected and
electing members of the public, and is therefore a necessary measure of climate change policy capacity.
The second and third measures each deal with intergovernmental relations. Multilevel
cooperation and multilevel financing are divided in order to illustrate the difference between a
collaborative, intergovernmental network of policy options and a network of financial support. They do,
still, operate within a similar jurisdiction, as provinces and the federal government can play a pivotal role
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in determining where and how municipalities may authorize discretion. Regarding the need for a
cooperative and collaborative policy options network, municipalities are reliant on upper levels of
government for their operational scope, as noted in the previous discussion of the Municipal Act.
Although the scope is broadly defined and interpretable in order to give municipalities broad authority to
govern as they see fit, intergovernmental cooperation provides a stronger basis for policy implementation
with regard to matters of international significance such as the climate emergency. Political and
environmental scientists such as Daniel Cohen (2020) argue for an interdisciplinary and
intergovernmental approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation policy, going so far as to write
that government policy at all levels “implicate[s] urban spaces in subtle and obvious ways” (60-61),
therefore demanding an intersectional, collaborative approach from all levels of government (57).
Rachael Krause (2011) writes that in the context of local policymaking for climate change action,
“financial and technical capacity … is a key determinant of … policy decisions” (49). Krause objectively
speaks to the necessity of intergovernmental financial cooperation, as the variation in municipal selffinance is wide. The smallest municipality (based on population size) that has declared a climate
emergency in Ontario is the Town of Goderich with less than 10000 residents, while the largest
municipality, the City of Toronto, is the largest city not only in Ontario, but in Canada with nearly three
million residents (see Table 1). Available revenue from property taxes and user fees would thus be
extremely varied (Henstra 2018, 123). For this reason, financial support from the federal government,
such as assistance from the aforementioned Canada Infrastructure Bank, or the provincial government
through grants or transfers is required. As well, the strong stipulations surrounding intergovernmental
financial transfers (Juillet and Koji 2014, 53) requires collaboration in order to properly and ethically
allocate government dollars.
While the previous three measures deal with the pre-policy conception process, the final
measure of effective climate change policy capacity surrounds the framing of climate change mitigation
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and adaptation policies. The introduction of climate emergency declarations to Ontario municipalities in
March 2019 means the issue is relatively new to the municipal policy agenda, and therefore must be
framed in a manner that demonstrates the necessity of policy initiatives without presenting the novelty
as a barrier (Peters 2015, 76). Agenda-setting and venue-shopping are common terms in the policy
process that refer to the act of having a solution be adopted as a policy on certain agendas and in certain
venues in order to have the solution adopted forthright. As a measure of capacity, these terms are
defined in a different manner. Climate change adaptation and mitigation does not have a single solution
and is not a single-venue/-agenda issue; rather, climate change policy capacity must incorporate agenda
and venue variances into its solutions. Essentially, if community support is a resource, and if
intergovernmental cooperation and financing are resources, then the broad scope of climate change
mitigation and adaptation is a resource. Climate change policies impact the policy networks of many
municipal operations including development, tourism, housing, water/wastewater operations, and solid
waste management (Carvalho 2018, 8). Similar to Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis of policy
development which assumes a congruence of problems, solutions, and political will is necessary to create
policy (Béland and Howlett 2016), this capacity measure assumes the necessity of intragovernmental
recognition of the climate emergency in order to create policy.

Capacity Theories (y-axis)
Some or all of the four measures described above are related or applicable to theories of municipal
governance. Each theory proposes a set of competencies which the respective authors deem necessary
for leadership. Comfort (2007), Labadie (2011), and Henstra and Thistlethwaite (2017) offer measures of
governance capacity in the event of crises and emergencies, while Taylor (2016) offers a number of
measures related to “good governance” in general. The theories are outlined in the following discussion
and applied to the four capacity measures in the Climate Emergency Policy Matrix (Table 2) in order to
justify the theoretical application and relevance of climate emergency capacity measures.
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Taylor’s 2016 article “Good Governance at the Local Level” defines common competencies of
municipal governance and applies the elements of “good” quality governance structure to Canadian and
Ontario governments. Taylor defines six dimensions and three supplemental determinants of “process
quality”, referring to the quality of policy making and subsequently the governance structure itself (2016,
6-8). The six dimensions include: “inclusivity, accountability, impartiality, administrative competence,
learning capacity, and efficiency [or] timeliness” (6-7) and are generally measured by evaluating policy
outcomes and service delivery efficiency, despite the undetermined utility of policy evaluation (26). The
supplemental determinants are: “formal rules … organizational norms … and institutional capacity” (8).
While understood as a single capacity measure for the purpose of this analysis, the difference between
the dimensions and the determinants is that the six dimensions impact the development of policy, while
the three determinants are impacted by the policy decision. The dimensions and determinants, however,
represent a broad model of governance measurement for total process quality review.
This comprehensive governance evaluation model serves to assist municipalities in determining
organizational productivity and utility as a measure of “good governance” (2016, 29). When compared
with the properties of the climate emergency capacity measures, good governance concepts are
necessary for intergovernmental cooperation and financing, as well as agenda/venue coordination. Taylor
(2016) notes the significant “embeddedness” in the municipal policy process, as local governments are
constitutionally linked to the financial whims of the province (14) and more broadly embedded in
“multilevel governance arrangements (15) as a facet of their existence. Good governance relies on
cooperation with other levels and bodies of government, and therefore also may be theoretically applied
to climate emergency policy practice in the two cooperation-derived measures of capacity. As well, the
dimensions and determinants of good governance focus on the policy process of high-quality
governments. Part of this process, found in the dimensions and determinants, involves understanding
when, where, and how a policy will thrive (7) and what must be social and political factors must be
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accounted for throughout the process (8). Climate emergency policy must too account for a number of
external circumstances, allowing the good governance theory to align with the fourth measure of climate
emergency capacity.
Comfort’s (2007) analysis of crisis management tactics posits that emergency response success is
determined by four factors: cognition, communication, coordination, and control (189). The theory is
founded on an acknowledgement of “the importance of both design and self-organizing action in guiding
coordinated action” in the event of a crisis or emergency (195) as well as Comfort’s notion that disaster
management requires a collective coordination and adaptation (192). The community- and collaborativedriven approach to emergency management aligns the crisis management theory with the advocacy
coalition and intergovernmental cooperation measures, as both are rooted in a collective response. In a
similar vein of emergency management theory, Henstra and Thistlethwaite’s (2017) risk management
theory studies the response to floods and climate change-related disasters in Canada to promote a
shared responsibility model of risk control. The authors suggest that, due to the inevitability of climate
change-related emergencies, risks must be shared by the community and its governing bodies. The
“burden of loss”, the “responsibility for risk reduction”, and the “costs of risk reduction” must be shared
(28). Similar to Comfort (2007), Henstra and Thistlethwaite (2017) align with the advocacy coalition and
intergovernmental cooperation measures, though they also align with the measure of intergovernmental
financing as the explicit “costs of risk reduction” as well as the implicit funding for the “burden of loss”
would require financial assistance (10). Finally, Labadie’s (2011) adaptive capacity theory of emergency
management is also specifically directed toward climate change mitigation and adaptation as it measures
the response capability of a system to variations in climate by evaluating economic resources, the
strength of government, infrastructure quality, and the strength of social protections (1253). Labadie’s
theory measures the response capacity of a system, such as a government, and therefore falls into the
two intergovernmental capacity measures for climate emergency policy.

36
Due to the four capacity measures theorized in the previous section of this analysis being
supported through some means by multiple existing governance capacity theories, the matrix of climate
emergency capacity is therefore grounded in existing emergency management and governance literature.
This analysis considers the ways in which the growing number of Ontario municipalities can use their
limited authority to enact policy change through climate emergency declarations. Provided that a
municipal government can measure its capacity through the lens of one of the four presented theories of
governance, the municipality could assess the strength of their community support, intergovernmental
support, and policy framing techniques in order to determine its climate emergency policymaking
capacity. The following discussion presents a number of climate emergency policy examples from
governments and advocacy groups that are supported by the four measures of climate emergency
capacity.

Policy Examples
Based on a review of council meetings minutes from each Ontario municipality that declared a climate
emergency between March 2019 and March 2020, common motivating factors include community
support to join the global movement of local government climate emergency action, or support from
council and environmental advisory committees regarding national and international reporting on climate
change action (see Appendix 1). Additionally, Sara Hughes (2017) writes that cities are independently
motivated to enact climate change policies due in part to the “unique set of capacities and political
opportunities” for mitigation and adaptation tactics available to urban governments (2-3). As these reflect
the character of the necessary capacity measures of climate emergency action, such as community
advocacy and intergovernmental consensus support, the policy process for Ontario’s climate-conscious
municipalities appears well-suited for upcoming policy solutions. While still novel and largely symbolic,
the lack of capital commitment for policies directly tied to climate emergency declarations does not
negate the social impact of the declarations (Henstra 2018). Direct municipal climate change mitigation
and adaptation action from the 47 municipalities is not yet measurable in terms of policy success
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evaluations; however, climate change policies do not require emergency declarations to be implemented,
as demonstrated by the following examples of policy entrepreneurship.
American examples from large cities such as New York City’s plaNYC and Boston’s Greenovate
Boston initiative are large-scale examples of municipal-community-state partnership that have led to
policy solutions in green infrastructure development, environmentally-conscious zoning, solid waste
reduction, and carbon emissions reduction (plaNYC 2011; Greenovate Boston 2020). Although these
initiatives continue to grow in both acclaim and outcome success, the scale and structure of American
metropolis governance is not easily replicated in Ontario. Rather, Ontario’s municipalities benefit from a
strong network of institutional advocacy through organizations such as AMO and the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities (FCM). AMO has been a partner of municipalities throughout the 2010s regarding
local climate change leadership. Although no advocacy has been documented since Ontario municipalities
began declaring climate emergencies in March 2019, AMO has helped to establish provincial agreements
and legislation on the municipal role in climate change policymaking, such as the Climate Change and Low
Carbon Economy Act, 2016 and Ontario’s Climate Action Plan (AMO 2016; 2018). FCM continues to
dedicate a substantial portfolio of resources to municipal climate action, as one of their defined focus
areas. Programs such as the Green Municipal Fund, Municipalities for Climate Innovation, and Partners
for Climate Protection connect Canadian municipalities with each other and with the advocacy efforts of
FCM in order to strengthen the capacity and response of local government climate change policymaking
(FCM 2020b).
With the exception of Toronto, the remaining 46 municipalities committed to climate change
action do not possess comparable resources or infrastructure to engage in interdisciplinary policy action
similar to New York City or Boston. However, although Hughes (2017) primarily studies the success of
urban city climate initiatives, they also note the social, often immeasurable success of programs such as
those provided by AMO and FCM, writing that collaborative and collective climate change mitigation and
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adaptation policy is part of a “behavioural change with the city government” and requires programming
for “increased resource allocation to climate change programs, increased inter-agency collaboration, and
energy conservation in municipal activities” (11). The network provided by organizations like AMO and
FCM strengthen the advocacy power of local government at the federal and provincial levels, yet the
network also provides the opportunity for municipalities learn from one another. Although network
theory in policymaking is negatively associated with a crowd of policy actors each looking to individually
benefit from and contribute to policy design (Peters 2015, 89), the policy examples that have resulted
from AMO and FCM networking place implementation responsibility with municipal actors rather than
with the community (ICLEI 2020, 4; 8-9).
City-specific initiatives are not individually reported on by FCM and AMO’s latest documented
climate advocacy action occurred in 2018, prior to Ontario’s municipal climate declarations being made.
The number of emergency declarations in Ontario steadily increased in the year between the first
declaration and the latest (Figure 1). However, following March 2020 municipal priorities have shifted
from climate emergency management to pandemic emergency management. The shift in priorities is
justified by the need for immediate resource allocation to public health. However, in the same way that
climate emergency policy demands an interdisciplinary and collaborative approach, the pandemic
response has proved that municipal operations cannot operate independent of one another. A recent and
notable addition to the municipal climate change policy response is the 2020 Declaration for Resilience in
Canadian Cities from former City of Toronto Chief Planner Jennifer Keesmaat. FCM and AMO provide, and
have been providing, both capital and information resources for municipalities to address climate change
before the impacts were considered emergencies; and, while the work of these municipal organizations
has driven municipalities to program and policy success, the climate emergency demands a more
innovative response. Similar to the novelty of climate emergency declaration, the 2020 Declaration
proposes that the unprecedentedness of the events of 2020 allows municipalities to respond to climate
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change and act on their declarations based on community momentum and the assumption that “a
coordinated effort by the federal government, provinces, and cities … can repair a half-century of
unsustainable planning that has compromised our health, access to housing, the quality of our air and
water, and the long-term financial viability of our cities” (Keesmaat 2020). The 2020 Declaration is
supported by a number of local mayors and planners as well as many planning and environmental science
professionals. This type of broad community advocacy combined with the demand for intergovernmental
cooperation and a focus on framing the climate emergency as a subsequent challenge to COVID-19
presents municipalities with an opportunity to align their initial declarations with the proposed policy
changes of the 2020 Declaration.
Policy solutions will vary for municipalities moving forward in assessing their role in climate action
and their capacity for policy action. The climate emergency is, for Ontario municipalities, a policy
opportunity. From a governance and policymaking perspective, solutions require more than simply a
problem to solve—policy solutions are made possible by political will, operational means, and
contextualization by policymakers that rationalizes “a preferred interpretation of social reality…for policy
intervention” (Juillet and Koji 2014, 43). The growing popularity of climate emergency declarations proves
the will exists and the FCM and AMO have continuously provided resources for operational means.
Climate Emergencies at the municipal level are shrouded by doubt of meaningful action due to the
constitutional nature of local government. This analysis, however, outlines the legislative context and reframing opportunity for climate change policy to develop and be implemented through an emergency
framework.

Conclusion
The climate emergency will only grow in urgency and gravity moving forward, making it the defining
international issue of the 21st century (Foster 2020). Each national, provincial, regional, and municipal
government in the world will have to consider the effect climate change and natural disasters will have on
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the people they govern. Planning for the impact of a climate emergency is not an issue of left-leaning or
democratic governments. Policy intended to help communities mitigate and adapt to increased flood
seasons, wildfires, droughts, food shortages, and infrastructure damage is an issue of governments that
have developed the capacity to respond to the emergency. Thomas Beamish (2020) defines climate
change as a “crescive” problem and in the “genre” of pandemic catastrophe, consistent with “the human
tendency to avoid dealing with problems … until they manifest as acute traumas” (217). The psychology
of climate change acceptance is widely studied and not included in this analysis, yet the consideration for
the delayed emergency response should be given to governments who have demonstrated their capacity.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the policymaking ability of municipalities in Ontario
and how the municipalities that have recently declared climate change can move forward within the
policymaking network available to local governments. By reviewing the legislative context of policymaking
initially, the normative albeit limited municipal policy system is established as a malleable option through
which municipalities may move forward with policymaking. More conclusively, the policy capacity matrix
represents both the theoretical aspect of municipal emergency governance alongside possible measures
of capacity. Municipalities may rely on previously established theories of governing in order to determine
capacity, or conversely may rely on known capacity measures to determine gaps in policy capacity that
can be filled through theoretical study.
Although currently halted while municipalities address COVID-19 and financial issues, the steady
growth in the number of municipalities declaring climate change between the first and most recent
suggests that as local governments become more accustomed to the current emergency, they will
continue with addressing the future emergency. Further research and evaluation of municipal climate
emergency declarations will have the resources to focus on the content of related policies and action
directly related to the declarations once the policy process is realized in implemented actions.
Additionally, climate emergency declaration analysis in Ontario may move beyond the municipal level if
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the climate emergency is considered by the Provincial legislature as a threatening emergency comparable
to those experienced in 2020. Emergency governance has traditionally been an afterthought of many
governments, however, just as municipalities have made policymaking normative in the face of ambiguity,
ongoing uncertainty may push governments to consider emergency strategies in a more consistent and
normalized manner as emergencies too become more consistent.
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https://calendar.wilmot.ca/budget/Detail/201
9-09-23-1900-Council-Meeting2/25ab7b9b149a-4d42-9aaf-aacc010bd9aa

N

Y

N

N

N

54

Windsor, City
of

https://www.citywindsor.ca/cityhall/CityCouncilMeetings/Council%20Minutes/Documents/20
19/November%2018,%202019%20City%20Co
uncil%20-%20Minutes.pdf

Woolwich,
Township of

http://calendar.woolwich.ca/council/Detail/2
019-09-24-1900-Committee-of-theWhole/84f7a9e4-948c-40d8-b9a0aae000a6db5b

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

